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This paper studies the optimal tax policy in welfare states where the nominal pension 
level is higher than the optimum level, but the government has difficulties reforming 
the pension because of  political voices which advocate expansionary fiscal policies. 
This research provides proper tax policy directions for the many countries 
experiencing this problem, especially developed countries in Europe. I built a 
recursive optimization problem based on a modified version of  two-period OLG 
model to which I added the pension system and lifetime uncertainty. By using an 
analytical approach and calibration, it is found out that a social planner can improve 
welfare by increasing the consumption tax, decreasing the labor income tax, and 
retaining the capital income tax in the situation of  an excessively high level of  
pension. Besides uncovering the optimal taxation, this research also gained a new 
insight that a proper tax mix can develop welfare when expenditure-side rigidities are 
present.  
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In many welfare states, the main issue related with a pension system is that young 
generations are more and more burdened so to support their old generation.; they 
are imposed a high level of  distortionary taxes to finance the pension. Such 
distortionary taxes thus decreases young generations' utility and then, reduce their 
work motivation. Factors that contribute to this socioeconomic problem are 1) `Pay 
as You Go(PYAGO)' system and 2) demographic trend, falling birth rate and aging 
populations. Most of  welfare states operate PYAGO pension systems where the 
current workers should financially support the current pensioners. As the elder lives 
longer and longer, i.e. aging populations and the birth rates decrease, the relative 
number of  the young to the old becomes smaller. Due to the coexistence of  these 
two factors, young generations are more and more burdened. 
One very simple solution to this issue is just reducing the level of  pension 
to alleviate the young's financial load, but it is hardly achieved because of  political 
movements such as citizens' strong desire to accomplishing a high level of  social 
welfare and governments' solid orientation to expansionary fiscal policy. Moreover, 
in the demographic trend, a falling birth rate and aging populations, the elderly 
become more relatively compared to the young and they give a strong voice to liberal 
pension system even though the optimal pension level should be diminished because 
young workers who can financially support elderly people become less. These make 
it more difficult to reform pension system.  
In this paper, I analyze how tax structures should be in this situation where 
the pension system deviates above the optimal level but it is hard to reduce its 
nominal value because of  political reasons. Prior to answer this question, it needs to 
be analyzed what tax systems welfare states have in reality. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data show that the countries 







  The replacement rate here is gross replacement rate of  OECD countries.1 
 
This paper examines whether or not such empirical tax trends are optimal and why 
the patterns are optimal if  it is true. By doing so, it is automatically answered how 
tax structures should be in welfare countries where people want benevolent pension 
system and then, the government cannot adjust the nominal value of  pension to be 
optimal. 
The main economic tool to find optimal taxes in this paper is two periods 
Overlapping Generations Model(OLG), i.e. people live two periods, youth and old 
age. At one point, young and old generations thus live simultaneously. The young 
generation works and bears labor income and commodity taxes to fund pension for 
                                           
1 There are three kinds of  pension schemes, public, mandatory private, and voluntary 
private pension scheme. I regard public and mandatory private pension scheme in the real 
economy as public pension in this model and then, the gross replacement rate is yielded by 
benefit provided from public and mandatory private pension. It is reasonable because 
government directly or indirectly affect the two pension schemes to secure agent’s future 
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the old generations. At the same time, the old one lives in their savings and pension 
without working and pay capital income and commodity taxes to fund pension for 
themselves. Such distortionary taxes to finance pension detract economic efficiency, 
but the pension system secure people's income when they retire. The social planner 
wants to maximize their social welfare function which consists of  not only current 
young and old generations but also unborn future generations. To find the optimal 
level of  pension, they have to consider that different levels of  pension bring about 
disparate effects. If  pension level is quite low, it creates a little financial burden to 
young generation, but does not secure old one's income. On the contrary, if  the 
pension level is quite high, it surely secures old generation's income, but it gives a big 
financial load to young one. As I said above, the main question in this paper is how 
government should construct tax structures to maximize social welfare when the 
pension level is set high by political processes. They can escalate social welfare by 
reforming tax mixes, because taxes can adjust real value of  pension to be the 
optimum indirectly. In the OLG model here, the high pension level is exogenously 
given and the optimal fiscal policies, i.e. taxes, are endogenously determined to 
achieve social welfare maximizing. 
Using analytical tool, I proved that the steady-state optimal tax mixes exist. 
To investigate how tax structures should be, I used qualitative analysis and so, found 
out that commodity taxes should increase, labor incomes taxes should decrease, and 
capital incomes taxes should not be changed in the steady state to maximize social 
welfare when the pension level is higher than the optimal one. The intuition behind 
raising commodity taxes is that even if  it is impossible to reduce nominal value of  
pension, the real value can be indirectly lessened by increasing commodity taxes 
because such taxes raise price level, so lower purchasing power of  pension. Using 
commodity taxes, the government let pension be close to the optimal level. The 
implication behind lowering labor income taxes is to motivate young generations to 
work. To financially support old generation, young generation already pays 
commodity and labor income taxes. When the pension level goes up, the young 
group should pay high commodity taxes, i.e. goods are expensive and their work 
incentive shrinks. To motivate the young to work and then increase the total output, 
the labor income taxes go down. The other reason for decreasing labor income taxes 
is to alleviate moral hazard. The young generation does not have a strong desire to 
saving for the future and thus, does not work hard because the high level of  pension 
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secures their future income. To reduce such laziness, the labor income taxes increase. 
The unchanged capital income taxes at the optimum in the steady state is consistent 
with Chamley(1986)'s result: to raise government revenue, labor income taxes can be 
used, but capital income taxes should not be exploited in the long run. Financing 
through capital income taxes reduces motivation to save, hinders capital 
accumulation, and so damages production efficiency. For these reasons, the capital 
income taxes should be fixed whatever the pension level is. Both young and old 
generations pay commodity taxes and only the former group pays labor income taxes. 
Combining the two results of  increasing commodity taxes and decreasing labor 
incomes taxes, we have a simple but very important implication: as pension level 
becomes higher and higher above the optimal one, current pensioners receiving such 
increased pension should bear more and more financial burden themselves at the 
optimum. 
This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 explains the OLG model and 
assumptions used to analyze optimal tax schemes in detail. Section 3 proves the 
existence of  optimal tax mixtures in the steady state based on the section 2's model. 
Section 4 shows very important results for main questions here using qualitative 
method with some specifications. Section 5 summarizes the key implications found 






    PYAGO: Pay as You Go pension system 
    OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
    OLG: Overlapping Generations Model 
CRS: Constant Returns to Scale 
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2. The Model 
A. Environment 
The key economic tool is OLG model. Based on this useful model, I set some 
assumptions to make the model simple but still describing the real economy. The 
assumptions are as follows. 
People live two periods which are youth and old age and then, young and 
old generations live contemporaneously. People work only when they are young and 
they pay labor income and commodity taxes to finance pension for the old 
generation. When people become old, they lose their jobs and thus, they live in their 
savings and pension. In this period, they pay capital income and commodity taxes to 
fund pension for themselves. 
There are identical people in terms of  both earning ability and preference 
for consumption and leisure, i.e. they have the same wage and utility function. This 
homogeneity assumption deprives pension of  redistributive function within 
generation. In the qualitative analysis, we will see how this supposition affects the 
optimal labor income taxes. 
Those who die right after the first period can consume their private savings 
for the second period consumption before dying. They cannot bequeath their 
savings to the next generation as they do not have children. This assumption limits 
the agents' behavior into consuming. However, these two behaviors do not make 
difference because people can use their money for their utility therefore their saving 
motivations are not changed. 
The agents have no borrowing constraint, because it is not perfectly sure to 
live the second period and so, they cannot borrow money in the first period on 
security of  pension in the next period. This assumption is realistic. In the real 
economy, financial market does not lend money on security of  only pension to 
people who do not have any property and children who pay their parent's debt. 
In this model, pension is exogenously set above the optimal level to 
describe the situation that pension level is determined by political process, not 
economic process and established higher than the optimal level to satisfy the public's 
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desire to benevolent welfare systems. 
Government can only raise their revenue through age-independent 
consumption, labor income and capital income taxes and there is no depreciation on 
capital. 
     
B. Individual's Decisions. 
(1) 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝑍𝑡+1, 𝑙𝑡) = 𝜃 ∙ (𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡)
1 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑈(𝑍𝑡+1, 1)








(2) (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡)𝐶𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡) 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 
(3) (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1)𝑍𝑡+1 = (1 + (1 − 𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1)𝑟𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑡 +𝑚𝑡+1 








A representative agent's total expected utility function is given as (1). Here, 
𝜃 is a survival probability to live the second period. So the former part in (1) is the 
utility that people face when they live until the second period with probability 𝜃. 
The utility is additively separable with the first and second period utility. The latter 
part is the utility that people face when they die right after the first period with 
probability (1 − 𝜃). They consume their whole savings in the first period before 
dying and thus, the first period consumption here is different with the one when 
agent lives until the second period. Both periods utility functions are strictly concave 
and twice differentiable. 𝐶, 𝑍,  and 𝑙  respectively indicate current(1st period) 
consumption, future(2nd period) consumption, and leisure. The subscript 𝑡 is the 
time when variables are realized. 𝛽 is time preference for the second period utility. 
In the youth age, people work and allocate their earnings into current consumption 
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and savings, 𝑎, for the future consumption – their saving is invested as the next 
period’s capital stock or is borrowed by government issuing one period risk free 
bond.. They pay labor incomes and commodity taxes at that time. Individuals, thus, 
face the first period budget constraint (2). In the old age, if  people survive, they live 
in their savings and pension. They pay capital incomes and commodity taxes at that 
time. Agents, thus, face the second period budget constraint (3), but their action in 
the second period is predetermined because they just consume their savings already 
allocated in the first period. The representative individual chooses 𝐶, 𝑍, and 𝑙 to 
maximize their expected utility in their youth age under the life-time budget 
constraint (4) which combines the first and second period budget constraints. In fact, 
we need no borrowing constraint in addition to (4) because we have an assumption 
that people cannot borrow due to their life uncertainty in above environment part. 
However, if  this constraint is non-binding, i.e. people save not borrow to maximize 
their utility, we can ignore this constraint. The numerical analysis in section 4 
supports that the constraint is non-binding, so we ignore it from now on. 
Individual optimization gives two Euler equations as follows.  
(5) 𝜃 ∙ 𝑈1𝑙,𝑡 + (1 − 𝜃) ∙
𝑑𝑈3
𝑑𝑙



























The first one (5) is intra-temporal choice between current consumption and 
leisure. The second one (6) is inter-temporal choice between current and future 
consumption. 
To address that our two periods model is consistent with the real economy, 
assuming the first period is equivalent to working period (25-60 years, at this age 
people work and save for their future) and the second one is equivalent to non-
working period (60-95 years, at this age people receive pension and live in their 
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savings and pension without working). In working period, people’s behavior is 
almost the same - they work and save - and then, we consider this period as the first 
period in our model. In non-working period, people's activity is also almost the same 
- they live in their savings and pension - and thus, we regard this period as the 
second period in our model. However, people die at different times during non-
working period in general. In other words, some people die long before the expected 
life of  the economy and others die long after it. This allows pension to function as 
an insurance to deal with such a stochastic life expectancy. The main weak point in 
this model is that we assume people die at the same period of  time i.e. those who 
survive after the first period die altogether at the end of  the second period. This 
implies that anyone who survives until 60 years cannot die at different times during 
non-working period, so they die at the same period of  time after living until 95 years. 
This setting does not permit a stochastic shock upon their life expectancy and so, it 
restricts the pension's role. However, the pension still secures income when people 
retire (the second period in this model and 60-95 years in the real economy). In 
other words, even under above strong setting, pension still plays its fundamental role 
as income guarantee during the non-working period and then, the optimal tax 
mixtures for the pension in this setting are not different with the setting where 
pension functions as insurance. 
  
C. Firm's Decisions. 
(7) 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡
𝑑) → 𝐹(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡
𝑑) 
(8) 𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝜋𝑡 = [𝐹(𝑘𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡
𝑑) −  𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡
𝑑 − 𝛾𝑡𝑘𝑡 ], 𝛾𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 
(9)  𝑤𝑡 = 𝐹𝑙(𝑘𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡
𝑑),  𝛾𝑡 = 𝐹𝑘(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡
𝑑) 
       Following the neo-classical growth model, we presume that the production 
function (7) is constant returns to scale(CRS) function and a single product and 
factors(labor and capital) markets are competitive. The production function can be 
changed into per capita version. Here, 𝑘 and 𝑙𝑑 respectively refer per capita capital 
and per capita labor demand. Firm's profit function is given as (8). 𝑤 and 𝛾 each 
indicate wage and rental rate. The rental rate is equivalent to interest rate 𝑟. Firm' 
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optimization behavior creates two first order conditions(FOCs) (9). Marginal 
product of  labor and marginal product of  capital are equal to wage and rental rate 
respectively at the optimum. 
     
D. Labor and Capital Market Conditions 
(10) 𝑙𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑙𝑡 
(11) (1 + 𝑛)𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡 
(12) (1 + 𝑛)𝑘𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡) 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 − (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡)𝐶𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡 
In the labor market, the labor supply from individual's decision and the 
labor demand from firm's decision should be equated at the equilibrium (10). In the 
capital market, the next period's per capita capital is equal to private saving minus 
government's debt (11). This means the net capital accumulation in the next period 
is the rest of  private savings after borrowing money to government. Here, 
multiplying (1 + 𝑛) is for reflecting population growth between two generations 
and the net savings of  one agent is divided into (1 + 𝑛) agents in the next period. 
We can replace 𝑎 with individual's first period budget constraint (2) and so, (12) is 
appeared. 
  
E. Resource Constraint 
(13) 𝐹(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡) + 𝑘𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 +
𝜃
1+𝑛
𝑍𝑡 + (1 + 𝑛)𝑘𝑡+1  
The resource constraint tells that the left hand side (LHS) is the total 
available products and the right hand side (RHS) is the total expenditures. In detail, 
the LHS is the sum of  the output and the capital at this period and the RHS is the 





F. Government Budget Constraint 













The government budget constraint is divided into two parts, revenues and 
expenditures. They raise money through debt – one period risk free bond – and 
distortionary taxes – we set distortionary taxes as linear or flat taxes not non-linear 
taxes. The first bracket in the left hand side is the taxes from young generation and 
the second bracket is the taxes from old one. The government uses their money for 
repaying their debt and giving pension. Here, pension is all of  government purchases. 
 
G. Equilibrium 
Given price 𝑤, 𝛾  and fiscal policies 𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑤, 𝜏𝑟 , 𝑚 , a representative individual 
chooses 𝐶, 𝑍, and 𝑙 to maximize their utility and a firm chooses 𝑘 and 𝑙𝑑 to 
maximize their profit. If  fiscal policies 𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑤, 𝜏𝑟 , 𝑚 satisfy government budget 
constraint given such 𝐶, 𝑍, 𝑙, 𝑘, and 𝑙𝑑 and such quantity values satisfy capital and 
labor market conditions, and resource constraint, price systems 𝑤, 𝛾, fiscal policies 
𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑤, 𝜏𝑟 , 𝑚, and quantity values 𝐶, 𝑍, 𝑙, 𝑘, and 𝑙
𝑑 are competitive equilibrium. For 
a pair of  fiscal policies, there is a competitive equilibrium in general. Among a lot of  
competitive equilibrium, government wants to find optimum which maximizes their 
social welfare function which consists of  not only current young and old generations 
but also unborn future generations. We call such an optimal allocation as Ramsey 
allocation. However, the main question in this paper is how government should 
construct tax structures to maximize social welfare when the pension level is set high 
by political processes. So, using this model, I will solve the social planner's problem 
that high pension level is exogenously given and the optimal fiscal taxes are 
endogenously determined to maximize social welfare. 
In the next section, I analytically prove the existence of  the Ramsey 
allocation in the steady-state when high pension level is exogenously given. For this 
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case, section 4 shows that how optimal tax mixtures should be in the long-run, using 
qualitative model with some specifications. 
 
3. Analytical Discussion 
A. The existence of  Steady-State Optimal Tax Mixes. 
To find the steady state optimal tax systems for pension in this dynamic problem, we 
use a dynamic program so called bellman equation. To construct the equation, we 
need to trim individual's decisions and RC, capital and labor market equilibrium 
conditions as follows. 
(a). Rearranging Individual's Decisions. 
(1) 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝑍𝑡+1, 𝑙𝑡) = 𝜃 ∙ (𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡)
1 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑈(𝑍𝑡+1, 1)
















(15) (1 + (1 − 𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1)𝑟𝑡+1) ∙ (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡)𝐶𝑡 + (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1)𝑍𝑡+1 = 
       (1 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡)(1 + (1 − 𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1)𝑟𝑡+1) 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡+1  
(16) 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1)𝑍𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑡𝑙𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡+1, 𝑃𝑡 = (1 + (1 −
𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1)𝑟𝑡+1) ∙ (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡), 𝜔𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡)(1 + (1 − 𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1)𝑟𝑡+1) 
(17) 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡(𝑃𝑡, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1, 𝜔𝑡, 𝑚𝑡+1; 𝜃, 𝛽), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑋 = 𝐶, 𝑍, 𝑙 
(18) 𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡(𝑘𝑡, 𝑃𝑡 , 𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1, 𝜔𝑡, 𝑚𝑡+1; 𝜃, 𝛽)  
By multiplying (1 + (1 − 𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1)𝑟𝑡+1) to both sides of  (4), we can obtain 
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(15). Replacing the coefficients of  𝐶𝑡  and  𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡  in (15) with 𝑃𝑡  and 𝜔𝑡 
respectively gives (16). Through individual’s optimization process, the optimizing 
choices are represented by price systems and fiscal policies as (17). The maximized 
utility or indirect utility is also denoted by such exogenous parameters and capital 
stock which they face.  
 
(b). RC, Capital and Labor market equilibrium conditions combining 
(19) 𝑘𝑡 + 𝐹(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡) + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡 −
𝜃
1+𝑛
𝑍𝑡 − (1 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡) 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 0 
By combining three conditions, RC, Capital and Labor market equilibrium 
conditions, they are summarized as one simple equation and then it reduces the 
number of  conditions which have to be considered. 
 
(c). Social Welfare Function 








The social welfare function at time 𝑡 consists of  indirect utilities of  not 
only current young and old generations but also future unburned generations. 𝜌 is 
the social discount rate or social rate of  time preference. The value function at time 
𝑡 is represented by the state variables at the time. 𝑘𝑡, 𝜏𝑟,𝑡, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡, 𝜏𝑤,𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑡.  
 
(d). Dynamic Programming (Bellman Equation) 




𝑍𝑡 − (1 + 𝑛)𝑘𝑡+1} +
1
1+𝜌
𝑊𝑡+1(𝑘𝑡+1, 𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1, 𝜏𝑤,𝑡, 𝑚𝑡+1)] 
To find the steady state Ramsey allocation which maximizes the social 
welfare, we firstly have to build a dynamic social planner’s problem as (21). We 
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should consider IBC, RC, GBC, Capital and Labor market equilibrium conditions in 
maximizing the social welfare function, but Walars’s law allows to eliminate GBC, 
and IBC is already included in the indirect utility. We, thus, consider only the 
summarized equation (19) to optimize the social welfare function. The bellman eq. 
(21) is appeared where 𝜇𝑡 is the lagrange multiplier for the combining eq. (19). One 
very interesting property is that using either the combining eq. or RC yields the same 
result and so, for convenience we use the latter condition in the dynamic 
programming.  
 
(e). Finding Steady State Solutions. 
The FOCs. of  (21) with respect to control variables 𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1, 𝜏𝑤,𝑡  are as 
follows. 
(22-1) 𝜕𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1 : −
𝜕𝑉𝑡
𝜕𝜏𝑟,𝑡+1




𝑊2(𝑡 + 1) 
(22-2) 𝜕𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1 : −
𝜕𝑉𝑡
𝜕𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1
= 𝜇𝑡 [( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑡,𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1) + ( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝑃 −
𝐶𝑡,𝑃)𝑃𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1 + ( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝜔 − 𝐶𝑡,𝜔)𝜔𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1] +
1
1+𝜌
𝑊3(𝑡 + 1) 
(22-3) 𝜕𝜏𝑤,𝑡 : −
𝜕𝑉𝑡
𝜕𝜏𝑤,𝑡
= 𝜇𝑡  [( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝑃 − 𝐶𝑡,𝑃)𝑃𝜏𝑤,𝑡 + ( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝜔 − 𝐶𝑡,𝜔)𝜔𝜏𝑤,𝑡] +
1
1+𝜌
𝑊4(𝑡 + 1) 
(22-4) 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑊1(𝑡 + 1)/((1 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝜌)) 
The lagrange multiplier of  RC is given by (25). The intuitive meaning of  the 
eq. is that the social marginal utility of  unit capital at this period should be equivalent 
to the present value of  social marginal utility of  
1
1+𝑛
 capital in the next period. The 
left hand side is cost and the right hand side is benefit when we invest unit capital at 
this period for the next period.  
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The state valuation function series 𝑊 given by differentiating the bellman eq. with 
respect to 𝜏𝑟,𝑡, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡, 𝜏𝑤,𝑡−1, 𝑘𝑡 are as follows.  
(23-1) 𝜕𝜏𝑟,𝑡: 𝑊2(𝑡) =  −
𝜃
1+𝑛
𝜇𝑡 [𝑍𝑡,𝑃𝑃𝜏𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝜏𝑟,𝑡] 




𝜇𝑡 [𝑍𝑡,𝜏𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡,𝑃𝑃𝜏𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝜏𝑐,𝑡]+ 𝜇𝑡 [( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝑃 − 𝐶𝑡,𝑃)𝑃𝜏𝑐,𝑡 +
( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝜔 − 𝐶𝑡,𝜔)𝜔𝜏𝑐,𝑡] 
(23-3) 𝜕𝜏𝑤,𝑡−1: 𝑊4(𝑡) =  −
𝜃
1+𝑛
𝜇𝑡 [𝑍𝑡,𝑃𝑃𝜏𝑤,𝑡−1 + 𝑍𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝜏𝑤,𝑡−1] 
(23-4) 𝜕𝑘𝑡: [𝑊1(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑡(1 + 𝑟)] =
𝜕𝑉𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑡  [( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝑃 − 𝐶𝑡,𝑃)𝑃𝑘𝑡 +
( 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡,𝜔 − 𝐶𝑡,𝜔)𝜔𝑘𝑡 −
𝜃
(1+𝑛)(1+𝜌)
(𝑍𝑡,𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑡)] 
Using Roy’s identities, we can express the partial derivatives of indirect 
















= −𝜆𝑡[𝐶𝑡𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡𝜔𝑘𝑡] 
By substituting the state valuation function series 𝑊 in the difference 
equations, (23) and Roy’s identities’ result (24) into the steady-state version of the 
FOCs, in the steady state we obtain the following homogeneous-equation system: 
(25-1) 𝐴1𝑃𝜏𝑟 − 𝐴3𝜔𝜏𝑟 = 0 
(25-2) 𝐴1𝑃𝜏𝑐 + 𝐴2 − 𝐴3𝜔𝜏𝑐 +
𝜇
1+𝜌




(25-3) 𝐴1𝑃𝜏𝑤 − 𝐴3𝜔𝜏𝑤 = 0 
(25-4) [𝑊1(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑡(1 + 𝑟)] = 𝜇[(1 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝜌) − (1 + 𝑟)] = 𝐴1𝑃𝑘 −
𝐴3𝜔𝑘 
Here, we ignore the time subscript because we focus on steady-state. The 
only solution to this homogeneous-equation system is as follows: 
(26-1) 𝐴1 = 𝜆𝐶 −  𝜇(𝑤𝑙𝑃 − 𝐶𝑃 + (𝐾 − (1 + 𝜏𝑐)) ∙ 𝜃𝑍𝑃) = 0 
(26-2) 𝐴2 = 𝜆𝑍 −  𝜇(𝑤𝑙𝜏𝑐 − 𝐶𝜏𝑐 + (𝐾 − (1 + 𝜏𝑐)) ∙ 𝜃𝑍𝜏𝑐) = 0 




[(𝑤𝑙𝑃 − 𝐶𝑃)𝑃𝜏𝑐 + (𝑤𝑙𝜔 − 𝐶𝜔)𝜔𝜏𝑐] = 0 
(26-5) (1 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝜌) = (1 + 𝑟) 
where, 𝐾 = (1 + 𝜏𝑐) −
1
(1+𝑛)(1+𝜌)
 . (26-5) is often referred to as the 
modified golden rule which determines the optimal capital stock per capita. This 
result indicates that the capital stock is set at its first-best level. Using the partial 
derivatives of the steady-state version of the individual lifetime budget constraint, 
(16), we can rewrite the 𝐴𝑖 as follows: 
(27-1) 𝐴1 = 𝜆𝐶 −  𝜇(𝐶𝜃 + 𝐶𝑃(𝑃𝜃 − 1) + 𝑍𝑃𝐾𝜃 + 𝑙𝑃(𝑤 − 𝜃𝜔)) = 0 
(27-2) 𝐴2 = 𝜆𝑍 −  𝜇 (𝑍𝜃 + 𝐶𝜏𝑐(𝑃𝜃 − 1) + 𝑍𝜏𝑐𝐾𝜃 + 𝑙𝜏𝑐(𝑤 − 𝜃𝜔)) = 0 
(27-3) 𝐴3 = 𝜆𝑙 −  𝜇(𝑙𝜃 − 𝐶𝜔(𝑃𝜃 − 1) − 𝑍𝜔𝐾𝜃 − 𝑙𝜔(𝑤 − 𝜃𝜔)) = 0 
Note that the terms 𝐶𝑃, 𝑍𝑃 and 𝑙𝑃 denote the direct marginal effect of  a 
change in the rate of  𝑃, not the total marginal effect. Using the properties of  the 




























The coefficient matrix of  (28) is a matrix of  substitution terms which is 
negative semi-definite and symmetric. Then, the slutsky terms shows the following 
properties. 𝑆𝑍𝑃 = 𝑆𝐶𝜏𝑐  𝑆𝑙𝑃 = −𝑆𝐶𝜔  𝑆𝑙𝜏𝑐 = −𝑆𝑍𝜔  and the only two terms 
𝑆𝑍𝑃 , 𝑆𝐶𝜏𝑐  are positive and the all other terms are negative. The first principal sub-
matrix of  the coefficient matrix of  (28) is negative because 𝑆𝐶𝑃 < 0. The second 
principal sub-matrix is positive to make the coefficient matrix negative semi-definite. 
We sure the third principal sub-matrix non-positive, but we are not sure that it is 
negative. With the assumption that the determinant of  the coefficient matrix is not 
zero, we sure the third principal sub-matrix is negative and the coefficient matrix is 
negative definite, so non-singular, i.e. invertible.  
 
Proposition 1. With the assumption that the determinant of  the coefficient matrix 
is not zero, the optimal steady-state fiscal policies can be determined. 
The solutions are  










where, 𝐷 denotes the determinant of  the coefficient matrix of  (28) and 
𝐷1 denotes the determinant of  the coefficient matrix with the first column replaced 
by the matrix on the right-hand side of  (28), and similarly for 𝐷2  and 𝐷3 . 
Substituting 𝜏𝑟,𝜏𝑐 and 𝜏𝑤 into  𝑃, 𝐾 and 𝜔 in eq. (29) and rearranging such eq. 
create the optimal steady-state fiscal policies 𝜏𝑟
∗, 𝜏𝑐
∗  and 𝜏𝑤
∗  represented by 






4. Quantitative Analysis 
A. Data 
In the previous section, the existence of  steady-state optimal tax mixtures for 
pension is proved, but we do not know the relationships between pension and 
consumption, labor income and capital income tax rates from the analysis. However, 
the empirical finding from OECD sample countries data(2011) tells that as pension 
level(here, replacement rate) rises, the commodity tax rate also increases. The 
simulation results of  a qualitative model with few specifications in this section are 
consistent with the empirical finding and explaining why it is optimal. It, thus, is 
automatically answered how tax structures should be when high pension level is 
exogenously given. 
 
B. A Numerical Model 
(30) 𝑈(𝐶, 𝑙) =
𝐶1−𝛾
1−𝛾













, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛾 > 0,𝑀 > 0, 𝜂 > 0  
(31) 𝐹(𝑘, 𝑙) = 𝐴 𝑘𝛼𝑙1−𝛼, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛼 > 0, 𝐴 > 0 
For quantitative analysis, we need specifications about utility and production 
function forms. The preferences are depicted by Kimball and Shpiro's (2008) form 
of  the King-Plosser-Rebelo (KPR) utility function which is widely used in macro 
economic literatures (30): where 𝛾 is the relative risk aversion parameter, 𝑀 is the 
work aversion parameter, and 𝜂 is the labor supply elasticity. Consumption and 
labor are not separable in this preference and so, the properties of  this model are 
very general. The production is described by Cobb-Douglas production function 
(31): where 𝐴 is total factor productivity, 𝛼 is capital share in production.  
Calibration parameters' values are set as follows (see Table 1). As the 
benchmark relative risk aversion and elasticity of  effort supply, 𝛾 = 2 and 𝜂 = 0.6 
are set. They are the values widely used in many empirical literatures. We normalize 
total factor productivity 𝐴 as 1. Survival probability and population growth rate – 
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respectively, 𝜃 = 0.94(94%)2 and 𝑛 = 0.006(0.6%) - arise from OECD countries’ 
data. The time preference 𝛽 is 0.4. The widely used time preference is between 0.96 
and 0.99 for one year, but we have to consider the one period in this model as 
35years and we accept 𝛽 = 0.4 which is 0.975 to the power of  35 as a time 
preference. Finally, exogenously given pension level 𝑚 = 4.966, social discount rate 
𝜌 = 0.009, and work aversion parameter 𝑀 = 0.65 are set to make simulated 
value - commodity taxes, pension replacement ratio and real interest rate - be 









                                           
2 The survival probability between 15-60years is 0.92(92%) from OECD countries’ data. In 
this model, the first period matches the working period, 25-60years and the survival 
probability for this working period can be regarded as 0.94(94%). A very important 
assumption related with 𝜃 is that even though people die at different time during either 
working period or non-working period in real economy, in this model they die at the end of 
each period simultaneously. Hence, 100% of agent lives the first period and 94% of agent 
who survive lives the second period and die at the end of the second period.  
3 Commodity tax rate is average of  all countries’ tax rates. Pension replacement ratio is 
gross pension replacement rate which include both public pension and mandatory private 
pension. The real interest rate is yielded by long term interest rates of  10 years treasury 
bond minus inflation rate. Except for population growth rate, all data is collected in 2011 
and only the population growth rate is gathered in 2010. 
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C. Simulation Results  
Indeterminacy. In finding the Ramsey allocation of  this problem, if  the all fiscal 
policies 𝜏𝑟,𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑤, 𝑏 and 𝑚 are free variables, there is indeterminacy issue, i.e. no 
unique solution. However, if  one of  them is predetermined when finding optimal 
allocation, a unique solution is appeared.  












′𝐶𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑡
′𝑙𝑡 +𝑚𝑡+1
′  
Parameter Definition Calibrated Value 
𝛾 The relative risk aversion 2.000 
𝜂 The effort supply elasticity 0.600 
𝑀 The work aversion parameter 0.650 
A Total Factor Productivity 1.000 
𝛼 Capital Share in Production 0.425 
m Given pension level 4.966 
𝜃 Survival probability 0.940 
n Population growth rate 0.006 
𝜌 Social discount rate 0.009 
𝛽 Time Preference 0.400 
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where, the coefficient of  𝐶𝑡  and  𝑙𝑡  and 
𝑚𝑡+1
(1+𝜏𝑐,𝑡+1)
 are replaced by 
𝑃𝑡
′, 𝜔𝑡
′  and 𝑚𝑡+1
′ . The unique transformed fiscal polices 𝑃𝑡
′, 𝜔𝑡
′  and 𝑚𝑡+1
′ 
which achieve social welfare maximization can be realized from several combinations 
𝜏𝑟,𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑤 and 𝑚. The reason why there are various combinations is that there are 
three constraints for 𝑃𝑡
′, 𝜔𝑡
′ and 𝑚𝑡+1
′, but four control variables 𝜏𝑟,𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑤 and 
𝑚 exist. The GBC restrictS one variable’s freedom among such variables and so, a 
unique Ramsey allocation is appeared. However, if  there exists 𝑏 as another control 
variable, 𝑏 is perfectly free variable and then, indeterminacy issue occurs.  
For this reason, by setting commodity tax rate as a benchmark rate 18.5% 
from OECD countries’ sample data, we can find the optimal pension level of  our 
numerical model. By setting pension exogenously given in the calibration model 
higher than the optimal level found when commodity tax rate is 18.5%, it can be 
analyzed how the steady state optimal tax mixtures respond to the change of  
pension level.  
 
The Base Case Numerical Results. Under the set of  calibrated parameters value, we 
obtain the steady-state Ramsey allocations which maximize the social welfare (see 
Table 2). The optimal equilibrium on key variables is as follows: {𝜏𝑐 = 0.185, 𝜏𝑤 =
−0.179, 𝜏𝑟 = −0.171, 𝑎 = 0.215}. The positive saving supports the idea that no 
borrowing constraint is non-binding and then we can ignore it – this result is used 
for analytical discussion in section 2 and 3. Using many different initial values in 
numerical model, the numerical result is a stable optimal point. This, thus, supports 
the proposition 1 that optimal tax mixtures can be determined.  
 




         C Z 
0.185 -0.179 -0.171 8.480 4.375 
l a RR k r 
1.282 0.215 0.570 427.6 0.015 
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Replacement Ratio(RR) = pension benefit / income = 𝑚 / (𝑤 ∗ 𝑙) 
 
Labor income taxes here are unrealistically lower than ones in the real economy. The 
homogeneity in terms of  productivity accounts for such low taxes. A crucial role of  
pension is to redistribute from high earning ability people to low ones. The 
redistribution, here, means that almost all people receive similar level of  pension but 
their contributions to the social welfare system are quite different depending on their 
wages. To redistribute, labor income taxes should be highly positive and then, it is 
possible to collect more money from high ability people and less money from low 
ability people. At the same flat labor income taxes, it is true that those who have 
higher wage pay more taxes. This model, however, ignore the heterogeneity and so, 
pension does not have the redistribution function. Hence, it is not natural that labor 
income taxes in this numerical model are different from the ones in welfare states of  
real economy. 
Capital income tax rates are positive in almost all welfare countries. 
However, the tax rate is strangely negative in this numerical model. This 
phenomenon also can be originated from our assumptions to make model simple, 
but I will deal with it in the end of  this section. 
 
Comparative Statics Analyses. I present comparative statics analysis which is how 
optimal Ramsey allocations including tax rates respond to the changes in pension 
benefit and parameter values.  
 
Optimal Ramsey allocations. In this part, we increase all parameters and pension benefit 
by 5% except for survival probability 𝜃, and increase the survival probability by 0.03 
to make it less than unity. Considering both ‘incentive’ and ‘income guarantee’ 
effects of  pension, social planner chooses optimal tax mixtures which maximize 
social welfare to respond the changes in parameter values. The comparative statics 
results are shown in Table 3.  
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TABLE 3. Comparative Statics at the Base Case Equilibrium (5% increase) 
 
(a) In the third column of  table 3, we see that commodity tax rates goes up, labor 
income tax rates goes down, and capital income tax rates and other variables are not 
changed as pension is set above the optimal level. Pension has an unique optimal 
level in real term, but it is exogenously determined above the optimum point. In this 
situation where government cannot control pension benefit to be close to the 
optimal point, adjusting commodity tax rates plays the role to control the real value 
of  pension indirectly because they can change prices and so modify purchasing 
power of  pension. Increasing commodity tax rate returns the exogenously highly 
determined pension to the optimal level. Because of  the higher commodity tax rates, 
young generations lose willingness to work. The higher pension demotivates them to 
work more and then, save more for their future consumption. In this context, to give 
young generations work motivation, the labor income taxes are diminished and 
therefore, their labor supply is not changed at the new optimum. The newly 
optimized labor income tax rate functions to perfectly neutralize the young worker's 
moral hazard from the higher commodity taxes and so, not only labor supply but 
also other variables including capital stock are not changed in the new optimal 
equilibrium. The total output in the new optimum is still the same because labor 
supply and capital stock are unchanged. The fixed capital income taxes at the 
optimum in the long run is congruous with Chamley(1986)'s result: to finance 
government budget, labor income taxes can be exploited but capital income taxes 
should not be used in the steady state. Raising revenue through capital income taxes 




↑m ↑n ↑𝜃(0.97) ↑𝛾 ↑M 
   0.185 0.304 0.256 0.221 0.169 0.228 
   -0.179 -0.296 -0.246 -0.216 -0.161 -0.222 
   -0.171 -0.171 -0.238 -0.128 -0.229 -0.171 
C 8.480 8.480 8.175 8.445 8.514 8.182 
Z 4.375 4.375 4.213 4.345 4.474 4.222 
l 1.282 1.282 1.288 1.289 1.295 1.237 
k 427.6 427.6 400.9 429.7 431.9 412.6 
a 0.215 0.236 0.317 0.332 0.260 0.215 
RR 0.570 0.627 0.585 0.567 0.564 0.591 
r 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.0157 
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For these reasons, the capital income taxes should not be changed whatever the 
pension level is. 
 (b) In the steady-state, as 𝑛 rises, capital stock per capita decreases, because 
one unit investment for the next period capital stock is allocated into more people 
who live in the next period. As a result, total output per capita in the economy 
shrinks and current and future consumption also diminish. This result is compatible 
with the Solow growth model that depreciation rate on capital and population 
growth rate lower the capital stock per capita. 
(c) As the relative risk aversion parameter 𝛾 increases, agents become more 
risk-averse and thus strongly want consumption smoothing. They hope to escalate 
the purchasing power of  pension in preparation for losing their jobs in the second 
period. Setting lower commodity tax rate and higher labor income tax rate satisfy 
agent's needs and so the social welfare goes up.  
(d) Next, we will see the effects of  work aversion parameter 𝑀 . 
Commodity tax rate goes up and labor income tax rate goes down to respond the 
increase in 𝑀. We can find a convincing explanation why the new equilibrium is so 
from the role of  𝑀. 𝑀 measures how individual avoids to work and so, a higher 
𝑀 means that agent hates to work. In a high 𝑀 case, agent take relatively a lot of  
leisure and a little of  current and future consumption. By decreasing labor income 
taxes, government can stimulate agent's work motivation and let them consume 
more. These new tax systems raise social welfare in response to the increase in 𝑀. 
(e) As 𝜃 goes up, the outstanding effect is that capital income tax rate rises. 
In the Euler equation (6) between current and future consumptions, we can delete 
from both sides and thus, it means that the survival probability has no impact on the 
inter-temporal choice. This is clear. Assuming that our total income fixed and we 
face the decision to allocate our income into current and future consumptions. 
Regardless of  survival probability, individual always save the same amount of  money 
with the saving that people do to maximize their utility when survival probability is 
100%. By doing so, no matter how the survival probability is, they consume the 
same amount in the second period if  they survive and they consume the fixed total 
income in the first period if  they do not survive. This leads them to achieving 
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maximal social welfare. Hence, the influence of  𝜃 on agent’s behavior can be found 
from the other Euler equation (5) between current consumption and leisure. 𝜃 in 
the left hand side functions as a weight value between two different marginal utility 
of  consumptions. If  𝜃 increases, the LHS - expected marginal utility of  current 
consumption - goes up because 𝑈1𝑐,𝑡 is higher than 𝑈
3
𝑐,𝑡 - consuming all income 
before dying diminishes the marginal utility of  consumption, 𝑈3𝑐,𝑡. In this case, the 
right hand side also goes up as leisure declines and so it equates the two sides. The 
intuition beyond the positive relationship between 𝜃 and labor supply is that the 
higher 𝜃 makes current consumption more attractive and so, it induces individual 
to work harder. As a result, when 𝜃 is 1, the labor supply, private saving, and capital 
accumulation arrive at the maximum amount. However, if  𝜃 goes down, the labor 
supply also diminishes and the capital accumulates less than the optimum level. So, 
the government stimulates workers to supply more labor and save more money by 
reducing capital income tax rates. This is an explanation for the negative capital 
income tax. Combining two Euler eq. (5) and (6) creates following eq.: 
(34) (𝜃𝛽𝑈2
𝑧,𝑡+1








       = −(𝜃 ∙ 𝑈1𝑙,𝑡 + (1 − 𝜃) ∙ 𝑈
3
𝑙,𝑡) 
We can check that as 𝜏𝑟 decreases, left hand side rises and so labor supply 
should increase to equate right hand side with left hand side. 
As 𝜃 goes up, the government’s desire to facilitate the willingness to work 
of  agent becomes weaker and then increases the capital income tax rates. Hence, 







TABLE 4. Comparative Statics at the Base Case Equilibrium  
(survival probability, given 𝑚) 
 
(f) The another very interesting implication stemmed from 𝜃 is that as 𝜃 increases, 
commodity tax rate decreases. This means that the current pensioner’s financial 
burden for their pension should rise. The economic intuition beyond this result is as 
follows: as elderly people become more – we can regard 𝜃 as the size of  the elderly 
or the level of  population aging, because it indicates the proportion of  people who 
live non-working period i.e. old age to total population – the young worker’s 
financial load to support the current pensioners is to be more severe and reducing 
nominal pension level can raise social welfare. However, it is impossible due to 
political reason like strong voice of  elderly people to liberal pension system. In such 
case, increasing commodity tax can indirectly reduce pension’s real value and transfer 
the financial burden from the young to the old. The following table 5 shows that as 
𝜃 rises, pension level should decrease at the optimum. This result backs up the idea 
that when it is impossible to reduce pension level, increasing commodity tax rate 





Variable Base Case ↑𝜃(0.98) ↑𝜃(0.99) ↑𝜃(0.995) ↑𝜃(1) 
   0.185 0.234 0.248 0.255 0.262 
   -0.179 -0.230 -0.246 -0.254 -0.262 
   -0.171 -0.096 -0.053 -0.028 -1.355× 10
-14
 
C 8.480 8.437 8.431 8.430 8.428 
Z 4.375 4.336 4.327 4.322 4.318 
l 1.282 1.291 1.294 1.295 1.297 
k 427.6 430.5 431.4 431.9 432.3 
a 0.215 0.377 0.425 0.450 0.477 
RR 0.570 0.566 0.565 0.565 0.564 
r 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
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TABLE 5. Comparative Statics at the Base Case Equilibrium  
(survival probability, given   ) 
Because of  indeterminacy issue, we should fix one of  policy variables to give pension 
variable freedom, i.e. make it endogenously determined. Here, we fix commodity tax rate. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In section 3, the main result is that with the assumption that the determinant of  the 
coefficient matrix is not zero, the optimal steady-state fiscal policies can be 
determined. In section 4, there are various results, but the key implications are 
related with tax structures when pension is exogenously set above the optimal level – 
this is the motivation of  this paper. In such case, increasing commodity tax, 
decreasing labor income tax, and not altering capital income tax achieve social 
welfare maximization. This result explains why the positive relationship between 
commodity taxes and pension benefit (gross replacement rate in this paper) in the 
real economy exist.  
 The contribution of  this paper is that it teaches us how tax structures 
should be in many welfare states where government or strong political parties seek 
expansionary fiscal policy or the elderly gives a strong voice to liberal pension system 
and then, reforming pension is hardly achieved. 
 By expanding our model in this paper, we can make it more realistic and 
obtain result consistent with the real economy. First, if  we introduce heterogeneity in 
Variable Base Case ↑𝜃(0.98) ↑𝜃(0.99) ↑𝜃(0.995) ↑𝜃(1) 
  4.966 4.770 4.717 4.690 4.662 
   -0.179 -0.181 -0.183 -0.184 -0.185 
   -0.171 -0.096 -0.053 -0.028 -8.420× 10
-15
 
C 8.480 8.437 8.431 8.430 8.428 
Z 4.375 4.336 4.327 4.322 4.318 
l 1.282 1.291 1.294 1.295 1.297 
k 427.6 430.5 431.4 431.9 432.3 
a 0.215 0.362 0.404 0.425 0.449 
RR 0.570 0.544 0.537 0.533 0.529 
r 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
２９ 
 
terms of  productivity i.e. earning ability, pension here can have redistribution 
function within generation. It makes the unrealistically low labor income tax be close 
to the tax rate in reality. Second, placing stochastic shock on total factor productivity 
allows us to see how transfer or redistribution from the young generation who face 
the shock to the old one is changed. For example, by imposing a positive shock 
which yields more output, we can expect that the transfer from the young who 
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균제상태에서의 연금과 최적조세 
 
김응식 
경제학부 경제학 전공 
서울대학교 대학원 
 
본 논문은 연금이 최적 수준 이상이나 정부가 팽창적 재정정책을 옹호
하는 정칙적 압력에 부딪혀 연금수준을 개혁할 수 없을 때의 최적 조
세 정책을 연구한다. 이 연구는 이러한 문제를 겪고 있는 유럽의 복지 
선진국들에게 바람직한 조세제도의 방향에 대해 제시할 것이다. 본 연
구를 위해 2기간 중첩세대모형에 연금과 생애불확실성을 도입한 모형
을 설정하여 이를 해석 및 수치적 방법으로 풀었으며, 그 결과 소비세
를 높이고 노동 소득세를 낮추고 자본 소득세를 그대로 유지할 때, 지
나치게 과도한 연금수준이 낳는 경제적 비효율성이 개선됨이 밝혀졌다. 
본 논문은 최적 조세의 방향뿐 아니라, 정부 재정 지출에 경직성이 존
재할 때 수입측면인 조세제도를 조절함으로써 사회후생을 개선할 수 
있다는 통찰을 제시하는데 의의를 지닌다.  
 
주요단어 : 연금; 소비세; 최적 정책 조합; 중첩세대 모형 
학    번 : 2011-23161 
